Bonikbarta Exclusive

Brigadier General (Retd.) Mohammad Hasan Nasir, former director of Army Headquarters, was a member of the national investigation commission led by Secretary Anisuzzaman, which was formed after the 2009 BDR mutiny to investigate the killings. Recently, General (Retd.) Moeen U Ahmed, who was the army chief at the time, made statements about the events of the day of BDR mutiny. Brigadier General (Retd.) Mohammad Hasan Nasir spoke to Bonik Barta about those statements and the investigation. Interviewed by  Anika Mahjabin, transcribed by Arfin Soriyat.

Former army Chief Moeen U Ahmed stated that he learned about the disturbance at Pilkhana around 9:30 am. Shortly after, he attempted to contact the former prime minister, but found her phone busy. He then immediately ordered the 46 Brigade to prepare for an operation, later named ‘Operation Restore Order’. Is it true that he issued the order to prepare for the operation right after receiving the information?

There’s a standing procedure in the army when it comes to preparations. Whenever there’s a potential emergency, an order is given for preparations, and time is allotted for it. This doesn’t mean soldiers are ordered to participate in the operation; it simply means, “Get ready.”

According to Moeen U Ahmed, he was able to contact the former prime minister at 9:54 am, at which time Sheikh Hasina authorized the 46 Brigade to move toward Pilkhana. Within an hour of receiving permission, the brigade set off for Pilkhana under the leadership of their brigade commander.

That timeline is incorrect. The army’s first detachment reached Pilkhana at approximately 10:30 am, having come from the Mirpur Cantonment.

Whose order was it?

This is correct. Under the orders of both his (the then army chief) and the 46 Brigade commander, the first artillery detachment passed through Jahangir Gate and moved toward Pilkhana. They arrived at Pilkhana at 10:30 am. Did he cooperate with the situation there?

So far, that’s correct. He ordered them to go, but didn’t order them to initiate an operation. They stationed themselves there and awaited further orders.

No operation until then?

No, no. No operation took place until the evening of February 26. Thirteen officers were killed between 10:30 and 11 am on the morning of February 25.

Moeen U Ahmed said the 46 Brigade vehicle arrived at the main gate at 11 am.

The first unit of the 46 Brigade arrived at Gate 4 around 10:30 am. Prior to that, at 9:50 am, a RAB patrol reached near Gate 5, close to the Darbar Hall. They entered within 100 yards of the Darbar Hall. RAB was explicitly ordered not to intervene. They wanted to enter, but without orders, they couldn’t. The army also didn’t receive orders, so they didn’t enter.

On February 25, Moeen U Ahmed, along with the chiefs of the three forces, met with the prime minister at Jamuna. At one point, the issue of the rebels’ surrender came up. However, the situation remained unresolved that day, extending into February 26.

By the night of February 25, all the rebels had left the country. By February 26 at 2 pm, the remaining few inside Pilkhana were also cleared out, having fled. The main killers escaped under the cover of night, possibly using ambulances. Four unregistered ambulances entered and left Pilkhana. And through these four ambulances, the main killers were likely smuggled out.

How could unregistered ambulances enter such a sensitive area?

They entered with the authority’s clearance. And similarly, they left with the authority’s clearance. At the gate, they should have been checked, questioned about who was inside, and stopped. But without any challenge or stopping, they exited.

Where did they go after leaving Pilkhana?

That night, planes took off two hours late. These are matters of proof. Without cooperation from the government, it wasn’t possible to prove any of this. We couldn’t trace where the vehicles went or what happened afterward.

What else came up in the investigation?

I remained part of the investigation until the end. But in the final 20-25 days, I was sidelined. During that time, many documents and much evidence were removed, and a report was prepared to fit a certain narrative.

Did Moeen U Ahmed have any role in this?

He wasn’t directly involved in this (in case of investigation). Higher authorities were involved. In fact he failed at his responsibilities as an army chief. There’s no doubt. He played an inactive role.

Did the rebels surrender at 5 pm?

There was no one to surrender. The innocents were there, but the real culprits were not. If we can determine how many soldiers were actually found, we’ll know whether there were any criminals among them.

What could he have done, and what didn’t he do?

Is it appropriate for me to comment on this at my level? He could have given orders. When one of his soldiers was killed and another wounded. A local commander would have been sufficient to launch an operation. You’re under fire; you don’t need anyone’s permission. My soldier has been killed, it’s common sense. You don’t need to consult the rules. You’re walking down the street, and someone attacks you. Do you need permission to retaliate?

After the army’s first detachment arrived at the gate, they were fired upon from inside. One soldier was killed, and another was seriously injured. Yet it’s said the army was ordered not to launch an operation.

The real question is whether orders were necessary. The local commander could have made that decision himself. If for some reason he issued an order, the higher authorities should not have refused it. A soldier has been killed, so you immediately go into action. That’s the natural rule.

Is it his failure to have deployed the 46 Brigade but not engaged in action?

Calling it a failure is an understatement. It’s a disgrace.