Bonikbarta Exclusive

Major General (Ret.) Imamuzzaman Bir Bikram served as the Director General (DG) of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) from April 1995 to February 1996. Later, he was appointed as the commander of the 9th Infantry Division tasked with protecting Dhaka. During his tenure, in May 1996, he thwarted a coup attempt by then-army chief Lieutenant General (Ret.) Abu Saleh Mohammad Nasim. He was also a key witness in the 2004 ten-truck arms case, which gained significant attention during the tenure of Sheikh Hasina’s government. He spoke to Bonik Barta about the role of law enforcement during Hasina’s administration and the BDR mutiny. The interview was conducted by Anika Mahjabin. 

Recently, Moeen U Ahmed made a statement. How would you evaluate Moeen U Ahmed’s performance as army chief? 

Moeen U Ahmed’s role during the BDR mutiny was not appropriate. At that time, he followed a submissive policy. He should have taken a firmer stance. He was overly dependent on the then-Prime Minister, carrying out her directives. The entire army was behind him during that period, so he had a responsibility to act. However, what he did was extremely immature. 

The failure also extended to the DG of BDR. Even though he had prior knowledge the day before, he took no action. He had said, “Let the event end, and then we will look into it.” But the incident unfolded during the event itself. The intelligence agencies should have been monitoring the situation in advance. The rebels were planning, printing leaflets, yet the agencies were not very active. They were more focused on the Prime Minister’s arrival at the ceremony. 

Why did the military become controversial under Sheikh Hasina’s rule?

Since Sheikh Hasina’s government came to power, the military has been given various benefits. Loans were provided for purchasing cars. Salaries were increased. During our time, salaries were around BDT 20,000-25,000, but during their time, it increased to over BDT 100,000, including all allowances. This started after 2009. Officers were sent abroad for training, and promotions were given to their chosen personnel. By providing such benefits, they essentially bought off many officers. 

The military was also handed various businesses to run. Many commercial ventures are now operated by the military. This has depoliticized them and diverted them from their primary objective. 

The military’s main role is to protect the country from external enemies and respond in emergencies. However, he had no strategy regarding neighboring countries. Sheikh Hasina reversed the notion that India could be our primary adversary and turned India into a friend, ensuring that we wouldn’t need to engage in conflict with them, even in times of need. 

Additionally, many officers who did not comply faced numerous cases, fines, and were removed from the military. Some were even placed in the infamous ‘Ainaghar’ (torture cell), sending a clear message: “If you oppose us, you will face the same consequences.” 

As a result, everyone became fearful. After the BDR mutiny, many who spoke out during the post-event meetings were dismissed from their jobs. 

Did law enforcement play any role in Sheikh Hasina’s extended rule of a decade and a half? 

A major reason for this was the actions taken by the military during various elections. Throughout Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, the military has maintained a silent role. During the 2014 elections, the government might not have been able to proceed without some support from then-army chief Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan. If Bhuiyan had stepped down, a caretaker government would have been required. However, his departure could have created the possibility for someone else to take his place. Even within the military ranks, there were discussions that if he left, there could be a change. However, they too were overly enthusiastic in supporting the government.  They were loyal to the government. All army chiefs have played similar roles.

Law enforcement was fully loyal to the Awami League. They worked in favor of the party, especially the police force, which severely oppressed the opposition party.

You served as the DG of DGFI before the 1996 elections, overseeing the June election. How do you evaluate the roles of those heading DGFI during the 2014, 2018, and 2024 elections? 

The intelligence agencies were blindly loyal to Sheikh Hasina. Their unwavering allegiance stemmed from the desire to secure promotions and preserve their jobs. They believed that their role was to ensure Sheikh Hasina’s victory in every election, which, in turn, would increase their benefits. 

During my time at DGFI, despite Sheikh Hasina being in the opposition, we supported her demands. When we saw that the Awami League was desperate for a caretaker government, we convinced Khaleda Zia to agree, which led to the election and restored peace in the country. 

Was every agency submissive to Sheikh Hasina’s government? 

Yes, every agency was submissive. Sheikh Hasina was in power for 15 consecutive years, and the officials believed that she would remain in power indefinitely. As a result, they continued to support her, backing her in every decision, whether right or wrong. 

How did the military’s attitude toward India shift to a friendly one? 

A country’s military generally maintains a cautious stance toward its neighbors, even if it isn’t openly hostile. In the past, Bangladesh held a neutral position toward India, neither considering them a friend nor an enemy. There was always some level of preparedness in case a conflict arose. 

This mindset existed during the presidencies of Ziaur Rahman and Hussain Muhammad Ershad. However, under Sheikh Hasina, this approach changed. After 2009, the military was steered away from viewing India as a potential adversary. Joint military exercises with India began, though this didn’t have a significant impact on us. 

You served as DGFI’s director from April 1995 to February 1996. Can you share your views on Aynaghar? 

During my tenure, there was no such thing as Aynaghar. We had a ‘Joint Interrogation Cell’ where terrorists and spies were questioned. Occasionally, detainees were brought in for a month or two, and we applied only the necessary pressure to extract information. However, we never resorted to torture. Fear tactics were used, but once information was obtained, the detainees were released. It wasn’t open year-round. In my tenure as DG, no one was brought there. I had to leave DGFI after eleven months. I was removed from DGFI because I wasn’t overly enthusiastic about taking extreme measures. 

After Sheikh Hasina came to power, Aynaghar was established as a full-fledged torture cell. One thing to note is that lower-level officers often take more extreme measures than the government dictates, overzealously inflicting torture. Brigadier Azmi, for example, was detained for espionage. As he was the son of Ghulam Azam, he was taken to Aynaghar as a form of punishment.

How did Sheikh Hasina’s government suppress the Hefazat movement in Shapla Chattar in May 2013?

The government used the police to suppress the movement. Police opened fire, resulting in many deaths, which allowed them to clear Shapla Chattar. The police acted with excessive zeal, inflicting the most violence on the protesters. The Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), and the army did not engage to the same extent.

Why were you removed from DGFI within less than a year?

Before the political transition in 1996, the BNP government wanted to assign someone strong to the 9th Infantry Division. As a result, I was transferred from DGFI to the 9th Infantry Division in February 1996. At that time, General Nasim, the army chief, attempted a coup. Khaleda Zia may have anticipated some unrest within the military. We handled the situation effectively, and during the June 1996 election, we remained entirely neutral, which led to Sheikh Hasina’s victory. If BNP personnel had been biased, the Awami League wouldn’t have won.

Can you explain the BDR mutiny?

The BDR mutiny was not an isolated event. After Bangladesh’s independence in 1972, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman said that the BDR soldiers who had come from the Mukti Bahini would not form the BDR. He believed there was no need for border guards, as Bangladesh and India were friendly nations. Instead, he proposed forming a national militia. However, the BDR soldiers did not accept this and staged a mutiny in January 1972, firing shots in the air. Although no casualties occurred, it was a sign of unrest. At that time, Major General C.R. Dutta was brought in to calm the situation, and he announced that the BDR would remain intact. The soldiers’ second demand was that the BDR should have its own officers, meaning army officers should not be deputed to the BDR. However, C.R. Dutta convinced Bangabandhu that without army officers, the BDR would not become strong. Thus, army officers were brought into the BDR. This created discontent. 

In 1990, a year before Ershad’s fall, another rebellion occurred. Again, there were no casualties, but the demand remained the same: they didn’t want army officers in the BDR. This demand was not fulfilled, and dissatisfaction simmered within the BDR for years. 

After the Awami League came to power in 2009, some BDR soldiers began engaging with Awami League leaders, expressing their long-standing demands, including having their own officers. Rumor has it that Sheikh Fazle Noor Taposh, State Minister Jahangir Kabir Nanok, and ruling party leader Mirza Azam communicated with BDR soldiers. The soldiers reportedly told them they were planning something, and it seems the leaders gave their tacit approval. On February 25-26, 2009, the mutiny took place. It can be said that two or three Awami League MPs knew about the plan. They might have sanctioned the uprising, but no one foresaw its severity, where 57 army officers would be killed. 

The mutiny was primarily carried out by the soldiers, with little external instigation. On February 25, they killed the DG and other officers. By February 26, the uprising had subsided. Sheikh Hasina met with BDR representatives and assured them that their demands would be addressed. The army took control after February 26 and quelled the rebellion.

Why did the mutiny escalate to the point where 57 officers and 74 people in total were killed despite politicians being aware of it?

There may have been external forces encouraging it. There could have been a conspiracy involved.

What led to such an event within two months of a new government being sworn in?

It was an intelligence failure. The agencies neither anticipated nor predicted the mutiny. They were focused on the prime minister’s visit to inaugurate BDR Week and failed to notice the soldiers’ planning in the background.

Did the Prime Minister sense that such an event could occur?

The day before the mutiny, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was scheduled to attend a BDR event on February 24 but did not. This alone suggests that she had some premonition of the unrest.

Why do you think Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina refrained from giving the army any orders after the rebellion began on February 25?

She probably wanted to avoid bloodshed. A clash between the two forces would have resulted in more casualties. She may be hoped to resolve the situation through negotiation and mutual understanding, which is why she called the mutineers for talks.

Why do you think the government treated the situation so lightly?

It’s hard to say that the government entirely supported the mutiny, but some members were aware of it. In reality, the BDR soldiers revolted against their officers. There was no intermediary; it was the soldiers who carried out the mutiny. That’s how I see it.

Many people claim that the Awami League planned the event. However, no Awami League members in Mujib coats came in and killed anyone. It’s fair to say that a few members of the Awami League gave their silent approval. They essentially said, “If you can do it, go ahead. We’ll see.” That’s how it could be interpreted. Perhaps Sheikh Fazle Noor Taposh and others gave such a message.

Some argue that the goal was to weaken the military. What do you think?

That is an exaggeration. I don’t believe that. If the intention had been to weaken the military, there would have been killings within the military as well. Why target only the BDR? Even though the BDR officers were army officers, they were working in the BDR at the time. So, it can be said that the intention was to weaken the BDR. There may have been encouragement from a neighboring country, but there was no direct involvement.

Recently, India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh instructed their military to increase surveillance over Bangladesh. How do you view this?

They are likely concerned that extremists from Bangladesh could cross the border into India, which could fuel unrest in India. However, India does not have the capability or the courage to invade and take over Bangladesh. They may be considering whether they can reinstate Sheikh Hasina by supporting her again. But I don’t think Indian forces could hold their ground in Bangladesh. It’s essentially just an attempt to scare us.

What impact would Sheikh Hasina’s exile in India have on Bangladesh politics?

There would certainly be some effect. If she had gone to another country, it wouldn’t be as significant. Every country views her as a burden, and no one is willing to take her in.

There was no military coup during or after the popular uprising of 2024, even though coups typically occur during power vacuums. Why do you think this time was different?

Under the Awami League’s rule, it was always emphasized that no government should be changed through unconstitutional means. Over the past 15 years, the army has been trained with that ideology in mind. Due to this, they didn’t have the courage to seize power. They were mentally conditioned to avoid undemocratic power transfers. In the 1970s and 1980s, such thinking existed, but it has since dissipated.

Additionally, the current army chief, Waker-uz-Zaman, is a neutral individual. If he had been overly ambitious, he might have tried to take power, but he likely realized that not everyone would support him if he acted alone, making it too risky. Furthermore, the constitution clearly states that the army cannot take power by legal means.

Can you tell us about the ‘Ten-Truck Arms’ case?

During Pakistan’s rule, the Pakistani government used the territory of East Pakistan to supply arms to Northeast India. That stopped in 1975. Intelligence agencies had always kept the Chattogram-Sylhet route open for arms smuggling. However, after the Awami League came to power, it was completely shut down. The claim that Bangladesh was used to supply weapons to Northeast India is not true. But under the BNP regime, this route was used, and the incident was exposed, leading to widespread awareness. Later, when Moeen U Ahmed visited India, the Indian government asked him to investigate the matter again. Upon further investigation, it was found that the arms were intended for Assam’s ULFA group. Legal proceedings were carried out, and the case was resolved with punishments. Although the BNP had previously conducted an investigation, it was dismissed under Indian pressure, and a new investigation began. The Awami League completed the investigation when they came to power in 2009.

Was the BNP government involved in the arms smuggling at the time?

I’m not sure if the top levels of the government knew, but intelligence agencies were certainly overzealous. As I’ve mentioned, many things were unknown to the Prime Minister and ministers, but mid-level government officials acted eagerly on their own.

You were the chairman of the Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC) at the time of the ‘Ten-Truck Arms’ case. Soon after, you retired from your position. Did the case influence your decision to retire?

There’s no connection between my retirement and the case. At that time, I was the chairman of BCIC, which is why I had to testify. The arms were unloaded in front of a BCIC factory, Urea Fertilizer Limited. So as an eyewitness, I provided testimony. The then-secretary of the Ministry of Industry was also a witness.