
Marc Saxer,
director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Office for Regional Cooperation in
Asia. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is the oldest political foundation in
Germany helps to promote democracy, build transnational networks and others. Anika
Mahjabin of Bonik Barta caught up with Saxer and discussed superpowers'
geopolitics in the Asian region and how it affects Bangladesh.
Mr. Marc, in one of
your articles you said that Washington has long started to shift its diplomatic
and military footprint in the Indo-Pacific as part of its ''Pivot to Asia''.
What part does it play in the politics of South Asia?
The 'Pivot to Asia' you
refer to was introduced by the Obama administration already decade ago. There
is a very strong bipartisan consensus in Washington D.C. that the only power in
the world that can be potentially par with the United States is China.
Therefore, this school of thought believes that the USA should focus its
strategic competition on China. Of course, a lot of things have happened since
then. For instance, the USA got entangled in regional conflicts such as
Afghanistan, Ukraine and potentially now in the Middle East. So this Pivot to
Asia has not been straightforward. But it is the overall strategic thinking in
Washington D.C. to move American attention, to move American capabilities
towards the Pacific.
Is it possible for
smaller countries like Bangladesh to remain neutral in the middle of two big
competitor- the US and China amidst their trade and geopolitical rivalry?
Well. I'm working in
this region, talking to a lot of people. I can tell you that without a few
exceptions, most countries in the Asia Pacific try not to choose sides. They
try to balance between rival superpowers. There is an overall understanding
that bipolar bloc building and technological bifurcation would result in an
economic loss for all. Some countries try to balance in order to avoid
opportunity costs. That's the overall posture. However, the interesting
question arises, is this a sustainable posture? Because there are structural
trends that may force countries to choose sides against their best interest.
And that will be the question that will determine the answer to your question.
What potential effects
might these geopolitical tensions have on the South Asian countries? In the
next decades, will there be any implications, especially in Bangladesh's
economy?
What's happening is we are moving into strategic competition. We may call that cold war 2.0. It is going to play out in the field of economics and technology. Different from the age of globalization of the past thirty to forty years, when the world economy was organized around the principles of markets and cost efficiency. We are now seeing geo-politicisation of the way the global economy is organised. For example, if you want to access your export market it will depend on whether the target market considers you a friend or not. So you either be invited in or you are asked to leave. If the two superpowers decide to de-couple the world of technology, you may have to choose your infrastructure, both IT and communication from one tech world, but also the product you export have to comply with these technological standards. If you invite investors to build infrastructure, there may be pressure to choose a side from one or the other. If countries having sovereign debt crises and they need a bailout there could be a pressure to choose. If you take the bailout from one side or the other. So all of these structural trends may put you in a tough spot politically.
Photo: Bonik Barta
Also, there will be an
impact on the development model of most Asian countries including Bangladesh.
Asian development models are usually based on the triangle of cheap labour,
export-driven growth, catch-up industrialization. Already with the pandemic, we
shifted towards more resilience, and today we focus more on reducing
geopolitical vulnerabilities. Both will accelerate digital automation,
robotization, algorithms and artificial intelligence. This will put enormous
pressure on the comparative advantage of your labour. Because the old
industrial countries will be able to produce at the same cost either within
their own market or in countries close to them. There is no need to offshore
labour to far away places. Second, if you need export for growth, but the entry
to your export markets is politicised, you may end up being shut out of some
vital markets. Finally, catch-up industrialization means that you need
technology transfer and you need to be integrated into the global supply
chains. But these are precisely the things that are now being weaponized in the
Cold War 2.0. So technology transfer no longer follows market logic but it
follows geopolitical logic. So a lot of people started thinking very hard about
how to adapt their development model to these geo-economic shocks, and more
generally how to manoeuvre in this new geopolitical world
You mentioned in an
article that in the future, important economic, technological, and
infrastructural decisions will increasingly be subject to geopolitical considerations.
What effects will it have on the developing nations in this region?
It will affect the
validity of your development model. A development model is the paradigm that
guides your journey towards development over decades. In Bangladesh and other
Asian countries, you have used the comparative advantage of cheap labour to
generate export-driven growth and gradually move up the global value chain.
This has worked very well for a lot of East Asian nations who have marched from
LDC status all the way to G-20 economies. Think Korea, Taiwan, and several
Southeast Asian countries like Thailand. Bangladesh is more or less following
the same path. But the problem is that now these external circumstances, the
environment in which you operate is changing dramatically. So the big worry is
that the ladder to move up the value chain is being kicked away.
Do you believe that
Indo-Pacific-focused political complexity will help South Asians in
establishing their political rights, particularly Bangladesh?
I'm deeply convinced
that the question of democratization is decided locally. I think overall the
influence of external actors on the question of the domestic governance regime
tends to be overestimated.
However, in this new geopolitical competition, countries tend to fare better if there is a broad consensus on the foreign policy posture. If you are internally divided, great powers may exploit these divisions to exercise influence. This is why it is so important to have an inclusive conversation about the course the country is taking, including stakeholders from all sides.